We study interactive communication of knowledge from the point of view of resource-bounded computational complexity. Extending the work of Goldwasser. Micali. and Rackoff [16], we define a protocol transferring the result of any fixed computation to be minimum-knowledge if it communicates no additional knowledge to the recipient besides the intended computational result. We prove that such protocols may be combined in a natural way so as to build more complex protocols.
Introduction
Transfer and exchange of knowledge is the basic task of any communication system. Recently, much attention has been given to the process of knowledge exchange in the context of distributed systems and cryptosystems. In particular, several authors have concentrated on problems associated with the interactive communication of proofs [16, 1, 22] .
In [16] Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackorf developed a computational-complexity approach to the theory of knowledge; a message is said to convey knowledge if it contains information that is the result of a computation that is intractable for the receiver. They introduce the notion of an interactive proof-system for a language L. This is a protocol for two interacting probabilistic Turing machines, whereby one of them, the prover, proves to the other, the verifier, that an input string x is in fact (with very high probability) an element of L. The verifier is limited to tractable (Le. probabilistic polynomial-time) computations. We do not limit the computational power of the prover, in the cryptographic context, the prover may possess some secret information ---for example, the factorization of a certain integer N. (This is analogous to the following model of a "proof system" for a language L in NP: given an instance XE L, an NP prover computes a string y and sends it to a detem1inistic polynomial-time verifier, which I uses y to check that indeed XE L.)
Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff called an interactive proof-system for L zero-knowledge if it releases no additional knowledge ---that is, nothing more than the one bit of knowledge given by the assertion that XE L [16] . Extending their definition, we consider all two-party protocols for the purpose of transferring from one party to the other the result of a specified computation ---y=f(x), say ---depending on the input x, and call any such protocol minimum-knowledge if it releases nothing more than the assertion that y=f (x) . Naturally, such interactive protocols are of particular interest in a cryptographic setting where distrustful users with unequal computing power communicate witl1 each other.
After giving our definition of minimum-knowledge protocols, we prove that the concatenation of two minimum-knowledge protocols is minimum-knowlcdge. This suggests the importance of the minimumknowledge property for the modular design of complex protocols. In fact, it is by serially composing several minimum-knowledge sub-protocols that we formulate the more complex minimum-knowledge protocol that we introduce in this paper.
In tl1is paper we extend the ability of interactive proof-system protocols from confirming that a given string x is in a language L to deciding whether XE L or Xi: L. That is, we give tl1e first (non-trivial) example of a language L so that both L and its complement have minimum-knowledge interactive proofsystems for confirming membership, where botl1 the proof of membership in L and the proof of nonmembership in L are by means of the same protocol, which releases no more knowledge than the value of the membership bit (XE L).
Furthermore, by following the protocol, the prover demonstrates to the verifier either that XE L or that Xi: L, in such a way that tl1e two cases arc indistinguishable to an eavesdropping tl1ird party that is limited to feasible computations. In fact, the protocol releases no knowledge at all to such an eavesdropper. As usual, we assume that tl1e eavesdropper knows both the prover's and the verifier'S algorithms, and we allow him access to all messages passed during an execution of the protocol. In spite of the fact iliat our protocol makes no use of encryption functions, the eavcsdropper receives no knowledge about whether he has just witnessed an interactive proof of the assertion that XE L or of the assertion that X\i!: L. We call this property of our protocol result-indistinguishability.
The proof that our protocol is minimum-knowledge with respect to the verifier and rcsultindistinguishable with respect to the eavesdropper relies on no unproved assumptions about the complexity of a number-theoretic problem.
The work of [16, 1, 22] concentrates on the knowledge transmitted by a prover to an active verifier. Introducing a third pany to the scenario, we analyze the knowledge gained both by an active verifier and by a passive eavesdropper.
If membership or non-membership in L is an intractable computation, then a result-indistinguishable minimum-knowledge protocol for L can be used as a tool in building a cryptographic system. After an execution of our protocol, the string x can serve as a cryptographically secure encoding ---shared only by the prover and the verifier ---of the membership-bit (XE L). The use of x as an encoding of the membership-bit exemplifies what we may call minimum-knowledge cryptography: it is a probabilistic encryption with the property that neither its specification (i.e. the interactive proof of the value encoded by x) nor its further use in communication can release any compromising knowledge, either to the verifier or to an eavesdropper. The minimum-knowledge property ensures that each party receives exactly the knowledge he is supposed to receive and nothing more. A cryptosystem whose protocols are minimumknowledge has the strongest security against passive attack that we could hope to prove: in particular, it is secure against both chosen-message and chosen-ciphertext attack.
The predicate that our protocol tests is that of being a quadratic residue or nonresidue modulo N for a certain number N (whose factorization may be the prover's secret infom1ation). We note that the language for which we show membership and non-membership is in NP fl co-NP. A conventional membership proof for these languages releases the factorization of N. while in the interactive proofsystem presented below no extra knowledge (about the factorization or about anything else) is given either to the verifier or to an eavesdropper.
An important motivation in our work on this protocol comes from our desire to guarantee the security of cryptographic keys, especially in situations where the generation of new keys is very costly or is otherwise limited by the context. If the integer N is the prover's public key in a public-key cryptosystem, then N is not compromised by polynomially many executions of our protocol; a polynomially bounded opponent knows no more after witnessing or paIticipating in these executions than he knew before the key was used at all.
Preliminaries

Interactive Turing Machines
We specify the model for which we describe our protocol; this is an extension of the model used in [16] . Two probabilistic Turing machines A and B form an interactive pair oj Turing machines if they share a read-omy input tape and a pair of communication tapes; one of the communication tapes is exclusive-write for A, while the other is exclusive-write for B. (The writing heads are unidirectional; once a symbol has been written on a communication tape, it cannot be erased.) We model each machine's probabilistic nature by providing it with a read-only random tape with a unidirectional read-head; the machine" flips a coin" by reading the next bit from its random tape. The two machines take turns being active. While it is active, a machine can read the communication tapes, perform computation using its own work tape and consulting its random tape, and send a message to the other machine by writing the message on its exclusive-write communication tape. In addition, B has a private output tape; whatever is written on this tape when A and B halt is the result of their computation.
In order to model the fact that the system is not memory-less, we also assume that each machine has a history tape, with a unidirectional write-head, on which the following records are automatically written:
• When the machine flips a coin, the bit it reads from its random tape is recorded on its history tape.
• At the beginning of each active tum, when the machine reads a new message from the other machine's exclusive-write communication tape, it records this message on its history tape .
• At the end of each active tum, when the machine writes a message to the other machine on its own exclusive-write communication tape, it records this message on its history tape .
• The result written on B 's output tape is also recorded on B 's history tape. These records are written on the history tape sequentially in order according to the machine's computation; for example, when the machine flips a coin several times while computing its next message, these random bits are recorded on the history tape immediately before the message. The input tape and communication tapes are public, or shared by the two machines; each machine's random tape, history tape, and work tape are private, as is B's output tape. This is not the only way to model the situation we would like to describe, and some of the records written on the history tape are redundant, but without loss of generality we may assume this mode of operation.
When A and B begin their computation, an infinite bit-string is written on each of their random tapes. The choice of these two bit-strings, independently and uniformly at random from the set of all infinite strings, defines a probability measure on the set of possible computation histories of (A, B) that begin in any particular configuration.
For any strings x, h we say that the interactive pair of Turing machines (A, B) begins its computation with input x and B's initial history h if in their initial configuration x is written on the common input tape and h is the written portion of B's history tape. (Throughout this paper, we are not concerned with the contents of A's history tape.) We use (A, B)[x.hll0 denote the set of computations that begin in this configuration. In each of the protocols that we present in this paper. B never consults its history tape. However, in discussing the properties of these protocols, we must be concerned with an arbitrary Turing machine that may take the role of B in an interaction with A, and that may make use of its history tape.
In what follows, B is limited to expected running time that is polynomial in the length of the common input x, while we make no limiting assumption about A's computational resources. (For cryptographic applications, A is also limited to feasible computation, but possesses some trapdoor information). Their messages to each other arc in cleartext, though these messages may depend on their private coin flips, which remain hidden. We assume that both the length of B 's initial history, as well as the total length of the messages written on the two communication tapes, arc polynomial in Ixl. For any input string x, we introduce the notation Hx = ( II I II E (0,1)·, I II 1= 0 (Ix 1° (I») for the set of associated initial histories that we allow.
Our scenario also includes a third probabilistic Turing machine C, limited to expected polynomial-time computation, that can read the input and communication tapes of A and B and knows their algorithms. A is the prover, B is the verifier, and C is the eavesdropper.
Ensembles of Strings
In order to speak precisely of the knowledge transmitted by communicated messages, we need the following definitions [16, 24, 6] . Let I!;; (0, I)· be an infinite set of strings, and let c be a positive constant; for each XE I, let 1t [x] be a probability distribution on a set of bit-strings. We call x. Each of these is the public view, and in particular that of the eavesdropper C, of a protocol execution of A and B. This set also has a natural probability distribution. (We assume that the specified computations do not make use of previous private or public history Let 7t and 7t' be two probability distributions on strings, and suppose that the number 8 satisfies 0~8~ 1. We say that n approximates n' with error probability 8 if 
Interactive Proof-Systems and Transfer Protocols
This paper is mainly devoted to a special sort of two-party protocol, that of interactively proving or disproving membership in a language L. A protocol tl1at achieves this is called an interactive proof-system for L [16] . The prover A and the verifier B share a common input x, the string whose membership is in question. We assume that x belongs to a fixed set /, /~L, of input strings for (A, B).
Depending on k=lxl. the length of the (binary) representation of the input string, we allow an error probability 8(k) that vanishes with increasing k. (In fact, all of the examples in this paper satisfy ilie stronger requirement of an error probability that is exponentially vanishing in k.)
Extending the definition of [16] , we distinguish between a confirming proof-system for L, whose pUIpose is iliat ilie verifier confirm membership in L for the input string, and a deciding proof-system for L, whose purpose is iliat the verifier decide whether or not the input string is in L. At the end of a confirming protocol, ilie verifier may either accept the proof that XE L, or reject the proof: at ilie end of a deciding protocol, the verifier may either accept a proof that XE L, or accept a proof that xe: L, or reject tl1e proof. The execution ends normally when all of B 's messages appear as if it is following the protocol: if this is so, then A ends the execution in a success state. A may halt the execution of the protocol if it detects iliat B is not following the protocol, ending the execution in afai/ure state.
For any input string x, let k= Ixl. We say that (A, B) is a confirming interactive proof-system for L witl1 inputs / and error probability 8(k) if:
1. For any XE L given as input 10 (A, B) , B accepts the proof with probability at least I-8(k).
2. For any interactive Turing machine A *, and for any x E /-L given as input to (A', B), B accepts the proof with probability at most 8(k).
We say tl1at (A, B) is a deciding interactive proof-system for L with inputs / and error probability 8(k) if:
1. For any XE / given as input to (A, B), B accepts the proof, haIling with the correct value of the predicate (XE L) on its output tape, with probability at least 1-8(k) .
2. For any interactive Turing machine A·, and for any XE / given as input to (A·, B), B accepts a proof of the incorrect value of the predicate (XE L) with probability at most 8(k). As part of the definition, we require that these conditions should hold independently of the choice of the initial-history string (of length polynomial in k) that may be written on B's history tape at the beginning of the computation.
In the first definition, we require that (Wit11 high probability) B correctly accept the proof for strings XE L, and t11at no cheating adversary, no matter how powerful, can convince B incorrectly to accept the proof for strings X~ L (except with vanishingly small probability). In the second definition, we require that (with high probability), given any input string XE I, B correctly decide whet1ler XE L or X~ L. and that no adversary can convince B to accept an incorrect proof (except with vanishingly small probability). The probability is taken over all sequences of coin-tosses (i.e. over all possible random-tape bit-strings) used by ilie probabilistic computations of the two Turing machines.
The two definitions above describe correctness for protocols that transfer to B the computed value of a Boolean predicate tl1at supplies one bit of "knowledge" about the input string. We can also study a more general sort of transfer protocol whose purpose is to transfer the result F(x) of any specified computation depending on tl1e input string x. For example, a deciding interactive proof-system for the language L is a transfer protocol for tile function F(x) taking thc value 1 or 0 according to wheti1cr or not XE L. Bccause tl1e interacting machines are probabilistic, the intended result may take values in a probability distribution whose value F(x, r) depends on x as well as on a random input string r. As in the case of an interactive proof-system, B may either accept or reject an execution of an interaction with another Turing machine. We say that a given protocol (A, B) is correct for a specified probability distribution of outputs if B's computed result, when it interacts with A, has tl1e intended distribution (witl1 very high probability), and no machine A·, no matter how powerful, can bias the distribution of B 's outputs (except with vanishingly small probability).
In order to defme "correcmess" more precisely, we observe tl1at the computations of any interactive pair of Turing machines (A, B) detennine a partial function/A H' as follows. Given strings x, r A' and r B , we define fA,H(x, r A' r B ) to be the result written on B' s output t~pe at the end of an accepting computation of (A, B) that begins wiili input x, when tl1cir random-tape strings begin with r A and rn (respectively): tl1is value is well-defmed, as long as r A and r B are sufficiently long. Notice tl1at the choice of r A and r B defmes a probability distribution/A,n(x", .).
We say iliat (A, B) is a correct transfer protocol for the probability distribution F(x, r), wiili inputs I and error probability 8(-), if:
1. For each XE I, the distribution/A,B(x",,) of B's computed outputs approximates. with error probability 8(lxl), tl1e distribution F(x,·) of intended results.
2. Let A· be any interactive Turing machine. We require that for any XE I and for any SE {OJ}", the probability that B accepts the computation of (A·, B) on input x and writes out ilie string s as its output is bounded by tl1e quantity prob(F(x, .) = s) + 8(1 x I).
Note iliat, according to ilie second part of this definition, it may be possible for a malicious adversary A" to bias the distribution of the set of conversations of (Le. the set of sequences of messages exchanged by)
A" and B on a particular input string x. But A· cannot significantly increase tl1e probability iliat any given result string is accepted by B; in particular, A· cannot force B to accept an erroneous result (one which occurs with probability zero in the distribution F(x, .» except with probability 8(1 x D.
Observe that the probability threshold 8 occurs twice in the above definition. In general, there may be protocols for which it makes sense to define correctness with two different 8's. In all our examples, the function 8(k) is exponentially vanishing in k; therefore, for simpliCity, we use the same 8 in both places.
Knowledge
In the setting of complexity theory, what do we mean by "knowledge"? Informally, a message conveys knowledge if it communicates the result of an intractable computation. A message that consists of the result of a computation that we can easily carry out by ourselves does not convey knowledge. In particular, a string of random bits ---or a string of bits that is "indistinguishable" from a random string (as defined above) ---does not convey knowledge, since we can flip coins by ourselves.
Minimum Knowledge
Suppose that (A. B) is a confirming interactive proof-system for a language L, taking inpuL<; from the set!. Following the definition in [16] , we say that the system (A, B) is minimum-knowledge if, given any expected polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machine B·, there exists another probabilistic Turing machine M B •. running in expected polynomial time, such that the ensembles {MB*[ hE Hx} are (computationally) indistinguishable. If the ensembles are identical, we say that the proof-system is perfectly minimum-knowledge.
The output of MBo, on input XE L and initial history h, is a simulation of BO,s view of the computation that A and B· would have on the same input and the sanle initial history. Note that, in this definition, we are not concerned with inputs that do not belong to L. When it takes part in a successful execution of the protocol with input x, BOO learns that (with high probability) the predicate of language-membership associated with the protocol, XE L, is true; however, it gains no more knowledge than this. Note that in our examples, B (the machine that acts according to the protocol specifications) does not use its initial history string at all; however, when we worry about the' 'knowledge" that a cheating machine BOO may try to extract from A we have to consider the fact that B* can use its history string.
The authors of [16] called a confirming proof-system satisfying the above properties "zeroknowledge." We now show how to extend this definition so as to be able to say when a more general sort of protocol ---for example, a two-party protocol whose purpose is to transfer to one of the parties the result of a hard computation ---should be called' 'minimum-knowledge." Let (A, B) be an interactive pair of Turing machines which constitute a correct transfer protocol for the probability distribution F(x, r), with inputs I and error probability 8.
We say that (A, B) is minimwn-knowledge if, given any expected polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machine B·, there exists another probabilistic Turing machine Mso, running in expected polynomial time, such that:
1. MB" has one-time access to an F-oracle, as follows. Given any input x and initial history h,
• queries the oracle with input x; the oracle returns a value distributed according to F(x,·).
The ensembles {MB,,[x,h]lxEI,hEH x } and {VIEWB,,{(A,B*)[x,h]} IXEI, hEH} are
indistinguishable.
x If the ensembles are identical, we say that the proof-system is perfectly minimum-knowledge. Note that, in this definition, the simulation MB*[x,h] is defined for any XE I and any initial history h of length polynomial in Ix/.
In order to motivate this definition, we recall that we are trying to formalize the notion o~ the amount of knowledge transmitted by a sequence of messages. Speaking informally, one gains no knowledge from a message which is the result of a feasible computation that one could just as well have carried out by oneself. If the purpose of a protocol followed by two interacting panies A and B is that A transmit to B a value v chosen according to the probability distribution F(x, r), we would like to be able to say exactly when the protocol transmits no more knowledge than this value. We might also demand that the protocol accomplish this even if B somehow tries to cheat ---that is, even if the Turing machine B is replaced by another (polynomial-time, but possibly "cheating") machine BOO. The simple transmission of the value v can be modelled by a single oracle query (with input x). If the provision of this oracle query makes it possible, by means of a feasible computation, to simulate BO's view of the "conversation" that A and BOO would have had on input x, then we can say that when A and B* actually have a conversation (i.e. follow the protocol) with the same input, there is no additional knowledge transmitted to B* besides the value v.
Note that if F is computable in expected polynomial time, then the F-oracle adds no power to the machine M B •• In this case MR. can compute F without the assistance of A.
Remark: In the above definition, we allow as an initial history string h any string of length polynomial in the length of the input string x. In recent work, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson introduced the notion of an interactive proof-system which is zero-knowledge under celtain complexity-theoretic "cryptographic assumptions" [13] . To prove the desired properties of zero-knowledge protocols in a cryptographic setting (where a fixed encryption scheme is used), one must restrict the (ensemble of) permitted history strings to be an ensemble that is indistinguishable from the output ensemble of a (polynomially bounded) "adversary" of the encryption scheme (as in the definition of cryptographic security of Goldwasser and Micali [15] ).
In all our examples, the simulating machine MB* uses the program of BOO as a subprogram or subroutine. This subprogram makes use of the simulator's input tape (containing the input string x). a virtual history tape (which is initialized to contain the given initial history h), a virtual random tape. a virtual work tape, two virtual communication tapes, and a virtual output tape. Without loss of generality we supply the probabilistic machine MB" with two random tapes; one of these is B"'s virtual random tape.
On its output tape ---which is also the virtual history tape for the subprogram B* ---the simulator uses the subprogram to write records that correspond to B··s view of the simulated protocol execution.
While carrying on its computation, the machine MB" may back up a few steps in the simulated protocol and restore a previous machine configuration: It recovers the old state of B* and the old content of the virtual work tape. and resets both the viltual read-head of B*'s random tape and the write-head of its own l output tape (the virtual history tape) to where they had been earlier; then it proceeds with its simulation, starting again from the old configuration but" flipping new coins" in its probabilistic computation.
The virtual communication tapes are used to simulate the communication activities of the simulated protocol. The simulator "sends" a message to B* by writing it on the appropriate virtual !mmunication tape and then activating the subprogram. The subprogram operates for (the simulation 01) e active tum, and then writes a message on the other virtual communication tape; this is the next messa e .. received" from BO. Just as in the interaction of B* with A, the simulator's subprogram B* records random bits, messages read and written, and the computed result on the virtual history tape. The operation of the subprogram B* during a simulated active tum, beginning in a certain state with a certain configuration of the virtual tapes, is identical to the operation of the interactive Turing machine B* during an active tum, beginning in the same state with the same configuration of the actual tapes, of an actual protocol execution with A. This matter of the difference in B* 's operation, either as a subprogram of the simulator or as a Turing machine interacting with A, is discussed further in Remark 2 at the end of the next section.
Concatenation of Protocols
I
Next, we investigate how protocols may be concatenated in order to achieve mOdula~ in protocol design, and how properties of the resulting protocol can be derived from the properties of its subprotocols. The protocol presented in this paper is an example of such a modular design.
We write s·s' for the concatenation of the two strings sand s'.
Suppose that we are given two protocols PI = (AI' B I ) and P 2 = (A 2 , B 2 ). We define the concatenation of the two protocols, denoted P = PI;P 2' to be the following two-stage protocol: Its first stage is PI' If at the end of this stage Al is not in a failure state and B I has not rejected, the protocol cominues with P 2: otherwise the protocol halts. We write Al ;A 2 and B I ;B 2 for the interacting machines of the concatenated protocol. At the end of an execution, the history tape of BI :B2 contains the initial history-string, followed by B I 's private view of the execution of PI' followed by B 2 's private view of the execution of P 2' Assume that PI and P 2 are two transfer protocols for the probability distributions Fl and F 2 , respectively. both taking inputs from the set!. Then the concatenated protocol, on input XE I. transfers to B 1 :B 2 the combined result [FI(x, .) ,F 2 (x,.)]. As a special case, suppose that PI is a confimling interactive proof-system for LI with inputs /, and that P 2 is a coniimling interactive proof-system for ~ with inputs L I
• Then the concatenated protocol is a confirming interactive proof-system for L 1 rV...,2' with inputs I.
It may not be surprising that the concatenation of two correct protocols gives the correct combined result. The more important observation is that, as we prove below. the concatenated protocol is minimum-knowledge if PI and P 2 are both minimum-knowledge.
Lemma: Given two protocols PI and P 2 as above. with error probabilities 0l(k) and 8 2 (k) , respectively. Then the concatenation P = PI;P 2 is a protocol that transfers the combined result
with error probability o(k) = 0l(k)+ 0Z<k)-ol(k),0Z<k). Furthermore. if PI and P 2 are both minimum-knowledge (or. respectively, both perfectly minimum-knowledge). then so is their concatenation.
Proof: First we show that correctness of protocols is preserved by concatenation. It is clear that if (AI' B I ) is correct with probability at least 1-°1, and (A 2 , B 2 ) is correct with probability at least 1-°2, then (A, B) is correct with probability at least 1-(°1 +°2-°1'°2), Similarly, it follows from the fact that \ no interactive Turing machine A; can force B I to accept an incorrect result for P I except with probability °1, and that no A; can force B2 to accept an incorrect resul t for P 2 except wi th probability °2, that no A * can force B to accept an incorrect result in the concatenated protocol except w' probability °1 +°2-°(°2, 
(As usual, the choices of the bit-strings that are written on these probabilistic machines'j random tapes define a probability distribution on both of these sets.) We need to show that the ensembles 
IPD(E I [x,hD-P D (E 2 [x,hDI> Ixl-n.
This implies, by the triangle inequality, that at least one of the inequalities We merefore conclude that the concatenated protocol is minimum-knowlcdge. Analogous arguments show mat the concatenated protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge if the same is true of both component protocols.
QED
Remark 1: This lemma also holds for minimum-knowledge protocols in the cryptographic setting, where the permitted history strings are restricted as described in the remark of Section 3.1 above.
Remark 2: We mention here a special case of the above lemma that we use implicitly throughout the proofs in Sections 5 and 6. Suppose that a protocol (A, B) is given, and consider a certain point in the protocol execution when A has just sent a message and B is about to perform its next active tum. Let PI be me protocol up to this point, and let P 2 consist just of B's next active tum. The lemma implies that if PI and P 2 are minimum-knowledge, then so is the given protocol through the end of B's next tum. This allows us to specify a machine M B " for our proofs below, simply by having the machine activate a subprogram B· as explained at the end of the previous section: As long as the subprogram, when activated, has access to a virtual history tape whose contents are indistinguishable from the history tape of an actual protocol execution carried on with A, its operation within MB" is identical to its operation during an actual interaction.
Result Indistinguishability
Next we introduce the eavesdropper C, as described above. Suppose that (A, B) is a transfer protocol for the probability distribution F(x, r). Observe that unlike the simulating machine in the definition of the minimum-knowledge property, this machine M does not have access to an oracle for F. In other words, M can simulate the communications of A and B on input x, regardless of the value F(x, r) (even if computing F is intractable), Since this simulation is by means of a feasible computation that an eavesdropping adversary could carry out for itself, the adversary gains no knowledge if it is given the text of a "conversation" belonging to the set COM { (A,B)[x] ).
We remark that if two protocols are result-indistinguishable, then so is their concatenation. The simulating machine for the concatenated protocol is simply the concatenation of the two simulators for the component protocols; neither the interacting parties nor the simulator makes any computation that depends on the history tapes.
Specification of the Language
Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the following notions from elementary number theory. (See, for example, [17, 21] for the number theory, and [19] for a computational point of view.) We will be working in the multiplicative group ZN" of integers relalively prime to N. Any clement ZE ZN* is called a (However, given the prime factorization of N, it is easy to determine whether or not z is a quadratic residue.) Several cryptographic schemes have been proposed that base their security on the assumed difficulty of distinguishing between residues and nonresidues modulo an integer N that is hard to factor [15, 3, 20] .
We also make use of Bernstein's law oflarge numbers [23, 19] 
The Language
The protocol introduced in [16] is a minimum-knowledge confimling interactive proof-system for the language
The protocol that we present below is a deciding interactive proof-system, which is both minimumknowledge and result-indistinguishable, for a language based on the same problem.
We use the notation v(N) to represent the number of distinct prime factors of an integer N.
Our protocol is concerned with integers of a special form, namely those with prime factorization there exists a quadratic residue mod N which has two square roots with different Jacobi symbols [2] .
The special integers that we require form a subset of BL, namely
N= (NINEBL,N=lmod4,v(N)=2}.
It is not hard to see that this set may equivalently be defined as N = {piqi I p;eqprime, i,j~ 1, pi=qi=3 mod4 }.
Finally, we define the languages
Taking I as the set of inputs, this paper gives a deciding interactive proof-system for L. Notice that /-L = {(N, z) E / I Z a quadratic nonresidue mod N }.
Outline of the Protocol
Our protocol is the concatenation of two sub-protocols. The first part is a confinning interactive proof-system for I. If the first part is completed successfully (i.e. if A proves to B that the input string is in /), thcn A and B perform the second part of the protocol. The second part, taking inputs from the set I, is a deciding interactive proof-system for the language L: A proves to B either that the input string is in L or that it is not in L. Both parts arc minimum-knowledge, and the second part is result-indistinguishable as well. The eavesdropper learns that, with high probability, the input is in I. But he gains no more knowledge than this ---in particular, he gains no computational advantage in deciding whether the input is in L or in I-L, i.e. whether or not Z is a quadratic residue mod N.
The confinnation that an input string (N, z) belongs to I in tum requires three stages, which are carried out in the following order; each stage confirms a property of N or of z.
1. N= 1 mod4, yeN»~ 1, ZE ZN-' and (N)=+l.
NE BL.
v(N)5,2.
While proving that our protocol has the properties that we desire, we make no limiting assumption about the computational power of Turing machine A. However, we remark that the protocol can be pcrfonned by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine A which is given the factorization of the relevant integers N. (In the cryptographic applications that we discuss later, the party that perfonns A's role in our protocol chooses N along with its prime factorization.)
We now give the details of our protocol: the confirming first part in Section 5, and the deciding second part in Section 6.
Interactive Confirmation of the Input Language
In each of the protocols that we describe, we usc the notation "A ~ B: transmission of a message from A to B.
Blum's Coin-Flip Protocol
., to indicate the Our confinnation protocol requires that A and B jointly generate a sequence of bits. The verifier B has to be sure that A cannot bias these bits. They do this by following a protocol due to Blum [2] .
An integer N E BL. N= 1 mod4. is given.
A and B generate a random bit b: This protocol is correct: Since B picks u at random and A picks the sign cr at random, the bit b chosen by the protocol is random. Furthennore, the first altem:lle characterization of BL (Section 4.2) implies that no interactive Turing machine A·, no matter what its computational power, can bias the bit produced, since it cannot guess the Jacobi symbol of the square root of v chosen by B with probability greater than 1/2.
We remark that a cheating Turing machine B* could bias the bit solely by using its ability to produce two numbers u and U', both square roots (mod N) of v, with opposite Jacobi symbols: this capacity would enable B· to factor N simply by computing the greatest common divisor (ll-U',N).
The protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge. The reason is that A's only task is to transmit a guess, cr = + 1 or -1, for a sign, a task that may easily be carried out by a simulator interacting with B·. We formalize this argument below.
The Confirmation Protocol
This is a minimum-knowledge confinning interactive proof-system by which A proves to B that the input (N, z) is in the language I defined above. It consists of the concatenation of three sub-protocols, each of which takes, as legal input, a string that has been confinned (with high probability) by the preceding sub-protocol. Let k denote the length of the input string.
First Stage: The easy properties of Nand z This stage involves no communications between A and B. Given (N. z) as input. B checks that
N == 1 mod 4, that N is not a prime power, and that (k)=+ 1. Each of these is easily accomplished in time polynomial in log N [19] . If anyone of these conditions docs not hold, then B REJECTs the proof (and halts the entire protocol).
Second Stage: N belongs to BL
The following protocol is due to Blum [21. The error probability of this proof-system is 8 2 
(k)=2-k •
This stage does not concern itself with z at all. The integer N must satisfy N== 1 mod4; this condition holds if the first stage has been completed successfully.
1. Repeat k times: In order to pick a list of random elements of ZN*(+ 1), A and B follow Blum's coin-flip protocol. which requires that N E BL and N =:: 1 mod 4. These conditions hold (with very high probability) if the second stage has been completed successfully. Proof: We treat each of the three sub-protocol stages separately. As a consequence of the lemma of Section 3.2, it then follows immediately that the concatenation of the three has the required properties.
First Stage
The first stage is, trivially, a confirming proof system for the language
since each of these conditions is validated by B in polynomial time without interacting with A at all.
Second Stage
Given an integer N=l mod4 (in particular, given input that has been confirmed in the first stage), the second stage is a perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming interactive proof-system for the language A can respond with a square root of the appropriate sign. B accepts the proof with probability 1. On the other hand, if N e BL then no quadratic residue mod N has two square roots with Jacobi symbols of opposite sign. In this case, it is very likely that there is some i for which A will be unable to send an appropriate S., and B will halt the protocol. The only way for a cheating A+ to convince B that NE BL (by I sending the appropriate elements Sj) is by guessing the entire sign-sequence a l , ... ,cr k : the probability that such a guess will be correct is at most Tk= 8ik). Thus, this protocol is indeed a confirming interactive proof-system for BL.
To prove the perfect minimum-knowledge propelty, choose any interactive Turing machine B+; we have to specify the computation of a Turing machine M B + whose output, on input N E BL and initial history h, is a simulation of B"'s view of the computation that A and B" would have performed on the same input. This view includes a message-history that consists of triples (r, a, s) satisfying the conditions implicitly defined by the specification of the protocol. As described above in Section 3. 
write out B·'s virtual history
For each of the k iterations, the expected number of times the loop has to be repeated is 2, since for any value of r the probability that (N) = cr is exactly 1/2; thus the expected running time of MH'" is polynomial ink.
The simulated messages "sent" to B'" are drawn from the same probability distribution as the messages sent by A in an actual execution of the protocol, and the random communications triples (r,cr,s) produced by M B
• satisfy the conditions s2=rmodN and (R)=cr. As explained in section 3.2, these messages are interleaved on the virtual history tape with the random-tape bits used by B"', exactly as they would be in an actual interaction with A. Therefore the sets MB", [N,h] and ViEWB*{ (A,B"')[N,Iz] ) are identical. This completes the proof for the second s~age.
Third Stage
Given an integer from the set {NI NEBL,N=lmod4,v(N»1} (in particular, given input that has been confirmed in the first and second stages), the third stage is a perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming interactive proof-system for the language On the other hand, if N has more than two prime factors, the probability of success in one uial is at most 1/4, and thus the probability that B incorrectly accepts N (when interacting with a cheating A"') is
To prove the minimum-knowledge property, given an interactive Turing machine B'" we have to specify the computation of a simulating Turing machine M B ",. The ensemble tJ1at MH'" must simulate includes a sequence of Blum coin-flips, so we begin by showing tJlat Blum's coin-flip protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge. To prove this, we must specify the computation of a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine Mcoin whose output, on input N (satisfying N E BL and N= 1 mod4) and or -u). On the other hand. if they have opposite Jacobi symbols mod N. then the outcome bit I-b has been detennincd by B* and not chosen at random. As noted above. this can only happen if B* can factor N. in which case it indeed has the ability to dictate the outcome of the protocol. regardless of whether it is interacting with A or acting as a subroutine for Meoin'
Whether the virtual history of B* written out by Mcoin was generated in step a or step b of the simulation. the distribution of its possible values (and thus the probability distribution of the bit encoded by the message triple) is identical to that of VIEWB*{(A,B*)[N.h]}. Thus the coin-flip protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge.
Next we describe the simulation by ME. of the third stage of our protocol.
The set
VIEWB"{(A.B*)[N.h]}
that ME" must simulate begins with a sequence of Blum coin-flips. which are used to generate random elements of ZN"' This simulation can be perfonned by foIl owing the program Mcoin as just described: the difficulty for .(vIB"" a polynomial-time machine tllat may not be able to factor N, is that those elements which are quadratic residues must be randomly generated along with their square roots.
Given as input an integer N that has been confimled by the first two stages and tllat satisfies v(N)=2, and given an initial history h. M H
• proceeds as follows: 1. i:= 0: A:= the empty list
do until i=k:
choose a random number a, 0 < a < N; if g.c.d. (a, N) ;t 1 (which happens with vanishingly small probability) then FLAG the number a, adjoin it to A, and go to step 3; else;
choose a random bit b (to decide the Jacobi symbol of the next element generated);
if b=O then adjoin to A a random element ofZN* (-I) Finally, to conclude the proof of Theorem 1, we see by the concatenation lemma that, given any input string at all, me concatenation of the three stages is a perfectly minimum-knowledge confirming interacLive proof-system for the language /1 (1/2(1/3 = /.
QED
Interactive Decision of Quadratic Residuosity
If the confirming part of our protocol has been successfully completed, then with high probability the input string (N, z) is in the language I. In particular, we know that v(N) = 2, that z E ZN', and that (N) = + 1; these are the properties that are required of the inputs to the next palt of the protocol.
This part is a deciding interactive proof-system for L, taking inputs from /. The proof-system is both perfectly minimum-knowledge and perfectly result-indistinguishable. As noted above, a pair (N,z) that is known to belong to / either is or is not also a member of L according to whether or not z is a quadratic residue mod N.
To make me exposition clearer, we present three successive versions of our protocol.
Lety=-l modN. Everything that folIows holds for any non-residue yE ZN* that has Jacobi symbol +1. As long as NE BLandN=lmod4, we can take y=-l. (Remark: If another non-residuey is desired, A can prove to B, as a preliminary sub-protocol stage, that y is a nonresidue by following the minimumknowledge interactive proof-system of [16] .) Let us fix some notation. For any XE ZN* we define the predicate
Recall mat ZN'(+I) denotes the set of clements of ZN· with Jacobi symbol +1. Since v(N)=2, half of these are quadratic residues mod N, and half of them are non-residues.
Our protocol relies on the fact that if rE ZN' is chosen at random, then ?modN is a random quadratic residue in the set ZN"(+I) and y?modN is a random quadratic non-residue in ZN*(+I): similarly, z?modN is either a random residue or a random non-residue in ZN *( + 1) according to whemer or not z is a residue mod N.
This interactive proof-system has error probability 8(k) = 2e-4A181. As explained above, if z is a quadratic residue then x's constructed in case 1 are indistinguishable from x's constructed in case 3. If A acts as specified, then when tile protocol finishes B will be convinced that z is a residue. The only way that a cheating A· can convince B mat z is not a residue is by correctly guessing, among all iterations during which B has sent a residue x, which of these were constructed in case I and which of them in case 3; if there are ck such iterations in a particular execution of me protocol, then the probability of successful chcating is 2-ck . Since c is very likcly to be close Lo 2/3, a simple calculation using Bernstein's law of large numbers shows that the probability of successful cheating is at most 2e-4k/81. Similarly if z is a quadratic nonrcsidue. Hence the above version is a deciding interactive proof-system for L.
However, this version is not result-indistinguishable. An observer of an execution of the protocol can easily tell whether he is watching an interactive proof mat RESN(z) = 1 or a proof that RESN(z)= ° by keeping a tally of me bits b sent by A in step 2 of each iteration.
Second version: a result-indistinguishable proof-system A simple modification of the above protocol does hide the result from an eavesdropper. The only change is mat at the beginning (before step i), A flips a fair coin in order to decide whether to use RESN(x) as the bit b to be sent to B in step 2 of each iteration throughout the protocol. R(x) can be regarded as an encoding, chosen at random for the entire protocol, of RESN(x).
In step 3, B checks for consistency in the obvious way: B should receive the same bit b in all case-l iterations and the complementary bit in all case-2 iterations; B should receive a consistent bit b in all case-3 iterations, and its value indicates to B whether or not z is a quadratic residue. As before, if in step fonnal proof of result-indistinguishability of the full protocol is presented below.
However, the version so far presented is not minimum-knowledge. For example, a cheating B" that wanted to find out whether a particular number ---17, say ---is a quadratic residue mod N could. du~ng one of the iterations, send x= 17 in step 1 instead of an clement x constructed at random according to 'B's program. A's response in step 2 will convey to B* the value RES~17), which is something that B* could not have computed by itself.
Third version: a minimum-knowledge result-indistinguishable proof-system
We can make this a minimum-knowledge protocol by refining step 1 of the version just presented; the refmement consists of several interactive sub-steps by which B gives to A what amounts to a minimumknowledge proof that the element x that it sends was constructed in one of the three ways specified (without giving A any knowledge about which of the three ways). The rest of the protocol is unchanged. The protocol now continues as before. A sends b=R(x) to B (step 2), and B checks b for consistency (step 3); and then they continue wi'th step 1 of the next iteration. Note that it is in A's "interest" to choose S at random in step 1.2, so that with overwhelming probability both S and {I, ... ,k)-S are reasonably large (and thus the probability that any particular column of T will be queried is close to 1/2). The idea is that any machine playing the role of B (and desiring that the protocol succeed) must follow the protocol, because if it tries to cheat during any iteration ---either by sending a number x in step 1.0 for which it does not' 'know" the corresponding number r, or by sending numbers tj in step 1.1 for which it does not "know" the corresponding numbers Sj ---then A will, with overwhelming probability, detect its cheating either in step 1.6 or in step 1.4. This is fOffilaIized in the following proof. Proof: First we prove that the protocol is a deciding proof-system for L. Since we have already shown that the second version presented above is a proof-system, it suffices to show that the refinement of step 1 preserves this property.
Suppose that z is a quadratic residue. The question is whether a cheating A· ---even if it does not choose S at random in step 1. Hence the protocol is indeed a deciding interactive proof-system for L.
In order to prove the minimum-knowledge property, we choose an interactive Turing machine B· that runs in expected polynomial time; we must describe the computation of a simulating machine M = M B
••
M has one-time access to an oracle for the result of the protocol, as explained in Section 3.1. M begins by querying the oracle on the input string (N,z) , the initial history h, and B"'s random-tape string, and learns (with very high probability) the value of RESN(z). The rest of the simulation is similar to that of the proof that the protocol of [16] is minimum-knowledge.
As its next step, M flips a coin to simulate A's choice of whether to compute R(x) = RESN(x) or R(x) = I-RESN(x) during the protocol.
In each iteration, M carries on the protocol through the end of (the refinement of) step 1 in a straightfolward manner: Muses B" to perfonn its own version of B's role, and M easily simulates A's role, choosing a random query S in step 1.2 and checking several congruences mod N in steps 1.4 and 1.6. If these congruences do satisfy the check, the difficulty comes in simulating A's communication in step 2, which consists of the bit R(x); how can M quickly calculate the correct value of RESN(x)? M accomplishes this by following the EXTRACfION procedure described below.
After B' has performed its computations in the simulation of step 1.1 and "sent" the matrix T, M saves the current configuration Co of B
O •
At this point, given Co (which includes a fixed random-tape string) and any fixed query-set S~ {I, ... ,k} that A might choose in step 1.2, the lists of numbers that B· would ., send" in steps 1.3 and 1.5 in answer to the query S are detem1ined. Let us call S a satisfiable query if these answers would satisfy A's verifying checks of steps 1.4 and 1.6, causing the protocol to continue with step 2. (A query that is not satisfiable would cause A to halt the protocol in its failure state.) It is easy to check whether or not a query S is satisfiable, by setting B·'s configuration to Co' "sending" S to B·, and checking the num bers that B 0 "sends" in return.
In suffices to show that this is so for anyone of the k iterations of the protocol. Consider, therefore, an iteration ---either of an actual protocol execution by A and B* or of the simulation by M ---at the beginning of which B* sends the matrix T, and let p (O~p ~2") be the number of satisfiable queries. With probability I-p/2k a randomly chosen query is not satisfiable, causing either the protocol execution or the simulation to halt: in this case, the actual history and the virtual history are identical. If p=O, then tltis is the only case that occurs. Otherwise, with probability p/2k, the original query S is satisfiable, and both the actual protocol and the simulation continue with step 2. As long as p~2, there is at least one other query that leads to success in the inner loop of M's EXTRACfION procedure, enabling M to "send" in its simulation of step 2 the correct value of b = R(x) , the same one that A would send during an actual execution. The factoring algorithm may be faster then the sampling process, in which case tlle correct value of b is computed directly. Either way, the actual history and the virtual history arc identical.
If p=l, then the probability that M's original query is satisfiable is only 2-k • In this rare case, the sampling process in the inner loop of the EXTRACTION procedure might never lead to success: the inner loop might not terminate until after N has been factored. Since the cost of factoring N is less than 0 (2,,), the total expected number of repetitions of the inner loop when p= 1 is less than r k ·2 k = 1. In this case, as before, the actual history and the virtual history are identical. Thls concludes the proof that the protocol is perfectly minimum-knowledge.
In order to prove that the protocol is result-indistinguishable, we must specify the computation of a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- yzrs j = Vyz(xt.) As presented, the protocol takes 0 (k) communication rounds, during which 0 (12) bits are exchanged. However, all k iterations of the main loop can be performed in parallel, taking 0(1) rounds. The simulator M can perform in parallel all k iterations of its main loop, and its expected running time is still polynomial in k. Similarly, M' can operate in parallel. Thus the parallelized version of the protocol is also perfectly minimum-knowledge and perfectly result-indistinguishable. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
QED
We note that there is another modification of the first version of our protocol that also achieves resultindistinguishability. A can always respond in step 2 with the true value of RESix) if B computes each x in step 1 according to a random choice among four varieties: to the types ?-, y?-, and z?-modN we add the fourtll type yz?-modN. If the protocol is to be minimum-knowledge as well, we can refine step 1 as in the third version of our protocol, adding an appropriate fourth column to the table used to compute Wi' 
Cryptographic Applications
In all our applications, we let N be the public key of a user A who knows its factorization. Within the set N, it is most advantageous to A to choose N to be of the form N = pq. with p and q of approximately the same size. A can follow our confirming protocol in order to prove to any other user that N E BL and v(N)=2. For these applications, we assume that the residuosity problem is intractable.
When A communicates with another user B, any element ZE ZN*(+l) can serve as an encoding of the bit RESiz), as soon as A has used our protocol to prove to B the value of this bit. According to need, z can be chosen by A or by both A and B together (say, by flipping coins). Because of the result-indistinguishability of the protocol, this encoding is cryptographically secure.
In contrast, the conventional approach to hiding knowledge from an eavesdropper is to use encryption. (For example, given two different protocols, one for membership in a language L and the other for non-membership in L, one could "pad" the protocols so that they both caused messages of the same length to be sent at each round of communications, and then encrypt all messages.) However. in this approach. proving a theorem about the security of the protocol against eavesdroppers usually requires an assumption about the security of the encryption scheme used.
Thus a sequence of random numbers z1' z2' .... zk can serve as a probabilistic encryption [15] of the bit-sequence RESJz1)' RES N (z2)' ... , RESN(z~, which in tum can be used as a one-time pad. sent either from A to B or from B to A.
Instead of using the zi directly to encrypt the bits RESJz), we can define a much more efficient scheme for probabilistic encryption by using the sequence RES N (z1)' RES N (z2)' .... RESJz~ as the random seed for a cryptographically secure pseudo-random bit generator [5. 24. 6 ] whose security may be based on the unknown factorization of N (e.g. [3.4] ). Sharing the seed. A and B can efficiently generate polynomiaUy many bilS and use them as a (very long) one-lime pad with which to send messages back and forth. The pad bits alone are secure against any polynomially bounded adversary; furt11ermore. the adversary gains no computational advantage in guessing any pad bit when he is given probabilistic encryptions of the bits of the seed, nor when he is allowed to overhear the protocol interactions that define these encrypted bits. Because our protocol is only used in order to initialize the system. this scheme has low amortized cost.
Whether the bits RESN(z) are used directly or to form the seed of a pseudom-random bit generator. the resulting schemes have the minimum-knowledge property with respect to B as well as with respect to an eavesdropper C. In particular. they are provably secure against both chosen-message and chosenciphertext attack. For further study of the power that interaction seems to add to public-key cryptography. see [10] .
Another application of our protocol gives a new private unbiased coin-Dip. generated jointly by A and B. The two users simply choose z at random ---for example. choosing its bilS by means of Blum's coin-flip. Note that the bits of z are public; it is RESN(z). the result of the coin-Dip, which is private.
In certain applications we can omit the confirming proof that N is of the required form. Suppose in fact that N has more than two prime factors. For any ZE ZN*C+l), A can carry out the deciding protocol as before. Now, however, ify and z ---both quadratic nonresidues in ZN*C+l) ---have different quadratic character modulo several of the prime factors of N, then A can distinguish numbers of the form ?-from numbers of the form y?-modN. and can distinguish each of tllese from numbers of the form z?-modN. (This is not true ifv(N)=2; recall that for such N any nonresidue in ZN*(+l) is a nonresidue modulo both prime factors of N.) Thus A can. at will, use our deciding protocol to "prove" to B either that z is a residue or that z is a nonresidue. In either case. the interactively proved value of RESN(z) ---whether or not it is the true value ---is cryptographically secure. This value gives B no knowledge whatever. The "proof' only convinces B that A can distinguish between numbers with different quadratic characters mod N, without releasing to B any information about the quadratic character mod N of any particular number. (This can be formalized in terms of a simulator M = M B
• for any given verifier B*. Note that at the beginning of the program for M !,riven in the proof of Theorem 2, we can replace the oracle query for RESiz) with a simple coin-flip; then exactIy as in that proof, the two sets VIEW B
• M[(N, z) , h] are identical.) Thus, we may say that in this case, the protocol is result-indistinguishable even with respect to B.
{(A,B·)[(N, z), II]} and
In this situation, when N has more than two prime factors, we can define the following game: A picks a random nonresidue z with quadratic character different from that of y. A then "proves" to user B} that RESiz)=bl, and "proves" to user B2 that RES N (z)=b 2 . The "proven" value of RESN(z) in each execution of the protocol is shared only by the prover A and the verifier B] or B 2 . In fact, user B} has absolutely no computational advantage in deciding whether or not b 1 =b 2 , and neither does user B 2 .
Conclusions
Approaching knowledge from the point of view of computational complexity, we have studied the interactive transmission of computational results. The protocol that we introduce gives a proof of the value, 0 or 1, of a number-theoretic predicate, RES N (·). In a sense that we make precise (extending the definitions of [16] ), the verifier gains no more knowledge from an execution of the protocol than this value; this is the "minimum-knowledge" property of the protocol. Funhem10re, we are able to analyze the difference between the knowledge gained by the active verifier and that gained by a passive eavesdropper of equal computational power; the protocol is "result-indistinguishable", in that an eavesdropper gains no knowledge at all by overhearing the messages passed during an execution. As a formalization of the notion of a cryptosystem's privacy and security against any passive attack, the minimum-knowledge property seems to be the strongest possible.
In a recent paper, instead of considering only protocols for transferring a computational result from one party to another, Yao studied a broad class of two-party protocols for what may be called' . cryptographic computation", in which the (polynomially bounded) users combine their plivate inpuL<; in order to compute private outputs in a minimum-knowledge fashion, preserving the privacy of these inputs and outputs and hiding partial computational results as much as possible; it may also be required that both users compute their fmal results simultaneously [25] . Under the assumption that factoring is hard, Yao showed how to design such a protocol for any given cryptographic computation problem. Continuing this work, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson proved similar results for multi-party protocols, assuming that one-way functions exist, and showed how such protocols could be made to tolerate faults [14] . Galil, Haber. and Yung simplified and extended these constructions for cryptographic computation, giving new methods for the design of fault-tolerant multi-party cryptographic protocols [12] .
In summary, the complexity-theoretic approach to measuling and controlling the knowledge transmitted in various distributed and cryptographic settings has proved to be a useful tool in protocol design.
